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COMBATING CYBERBULLYING WITHIN 
THE METES AND BOUNDS OF EXISTING 
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Phoebe Nora Mary Prince, a pretty blue-eyed Irish teenager, 
moved to South Hadley, Massachusetts, in the summer of 2009.1 A 
troubled girl, Phoebe had a history of bipolar disorder, depression, 
and self-mutilation.2 The move to America seemed like the perfect 
opportunity to make a fresh start. She started her freshman year at 
South Hadley High School that fall.3 Unfortunately, the new girl 
quickly became the target of ruthless and insufferable harassment at 
the hands of her peers.4  
Much of the bullying stemmed from Phoebe’s relationships with 
certain boys.5 One female classmate, jealous that a boy she liked was 
taking Phoebe to a school dance, told Phoebe she should kill herself.6 
Other students called Phoebe an “Irish slut,” physically threatened 
her, and knocked books from her hands on a daily basis.7 Someone 
also scribbled her out of a class picture hanging up at school.8 Even at 
                                                                                                                 
1 Ramin Setoodeh, Phoebe Prince’s Legacy: A Town Tries To Heal, PEOPLE, Oct. 18, 
2010, at 63; Anne-Marie Dorning, New Developments Raise New Questions in Suicide of 
Phoebe Prince, ABC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/settlement-federal-
investigation-raise-questions-wrongdoing-case-15/story?id=12394493&page=1. 
2 Jessica Bennett, From Lockers to Lockup: School Bullying in the Digital Age Can Have 
Tragic Consequences. But Should It Be a Crime?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 2010, at 38, 40. 
3 Jessica Van Sack et al., Pal: Suicide Victim Target of Bullies: Girls ‘Jealous’ of 
Popular Teen, Friend Says, BOS. HERALD, Jan. 26, 2010, at 6. 
4 Erick Eckholm & Katie Zezima, 9 Teenagers are Charged After Suicide of Classmate, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 2010, at A14. One student believes Phoebe was chosen because she was 
new, different, and unfamiliar with the school. Id. 
5 Setoodeh, supra note 1, at 63. Two boys, including the football team captain, were 
charged with statutory rape shortly after Phoebe committed suicide. Id. at 60–63; Eckholm & 
Zezima, supra note 4, at A14. 
6 Van Sack, supra note 3. 
7 Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 4, at A14. 
8 Bennett, supra note 2, at 39. 
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home, Phoebe found no safe haven. Her bullies mocked her on 
Facebook9 and harassed her via text messages.10 
It all became too much for Phoebe. In January 2010, while Phoebe 
was walking home from school, some students hurled a crumpled 
soda can and shouted obscenities at her from a passing car.11 
Although she had endured similar treatment over the past several 
months,12 at that moment Phoebe’s suffering crescendoed, and she 
text-messaged a friend that she “[couldn’t] do it anymore.”13 Her little 
sister found her hanging from a stairwell later that afternoon.14 
Phoebe is just one of the many teens who have taken their lives in 
response to relentless bullying. In Ohio, four students from the same 
high school killed themselves within a three-year span as the result of 
teen bullying.15 One of the students, Jennifer Eyring, was bullied 
because of her learning disability.16 She pleaded with her mother 
every morning to let her stay home and, when forced into school, 
needed Pepto-Bismol to calm her stomach.17 Jennifer overdosed on 
antidepressant pills in 2006.18 Eric Mohat and Meredith Rezak, close 
friends, faced ruthless harassment because their peers believed they 
were gay.19 In 2007, the friends shot themselves to escape their 
pain.20 A year later, Sladjana Vidovic also committed suicide after 
months of ridicule from fellow students.21 Classmates called Sladjana 
a “slut” and made fun of her thick Croatian accent.22 She ultimately 
jumped out of her bedroom window with a rope tied around her 
neck.23  
While these Ohio students were all victims of traditional bullying, 
modern technology now plays a significant role in many teen 
suicides. For example, Jessica Logan, a student in the Cincinnati 
                                                                                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 4, at A14. 
11 Bennett, supra note 2, at 39. 
12 Peter Schworm & Brian Ballou, 9 Teens Charged in Girl’s Bullying, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 
30, 2010, at Metro 1 (reporting comments of the District Attorney that “[t]he events were not 
isolated, but the culmination of a nearly-three month campaign of verbally assaultive behavior 
and threats of physical harm”). 
13 Bennett, supra note 2, at 40.  
14 Id. at 39. 
15 Meghan Barr, 1 Ohio School, 4 Bullied Teens Dead at Own Hand, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 
8, 2010, 2:56 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39578548/ns/health-kids_and_parenting. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. Eric’s parents requested that the coroner label his death “bullicide.” Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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suburb of Montgomery, Ohio,24 hanged herself in 2008 after an ex-
boyfriend disseminated nude photographs of her to hundreds of 
students.25 Female classmates called her a “slut” and “whore.”26 
According to her mother, Jessica committed suicide because the 
harassment became unbearable.27 Tyler Clementi committed suicide 
after his roommate, Dharun Ravi, allegedly broadcast a live sexual 
encounter between Tyler and another male over the Internet.28 When 
Tyler learned of the broadcast, he jumped off the George Washington 
Bridge into the Hudson River.29 
Stories such as these have led the media to suggest that bullying 
has reached pandemic levels.30 Indeed, bullying is a growing problem 
in American schools. One hundred sixty thousand children will miss 
school today for fear of being bullied.31 With the advent and 
popularization of the Internet, an age-old practice has taken on an 
entirely new form. Victimization that was once limited to buses and 
playgrounds now extends to the home computer and cell phone.32 
Victims can no longer find a safe haven in their bedrooms.33  
This Note explores the cyberbullying controversy, focusing on the 
conflict between the desire of schools to provide a safe learning 
environment and the First Amendment rights of their students.34 Part I 
discusses the seriousness of bullying and why it is particularly 
harmful in the cyber age. Part II then details the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of student speech and a school’s ability to regulate that 
                                                                                                                 
24 Mom’s Fight to End Cyber Abuse, CBS NEWS (May 14, 2009, 11:35 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/05/14/earlyshow/main5013235.shtml?tag=contentMain;c
ontentAux. 
25 Id.; see also Timothy Wilson, Teens Online and on Cells But Not on Their Guard: 
Group Calls Attention to Safety Concerns, WASH. POST, July 9, 2009, at District Extra 3 
(reporting that one-fifth of teens have sent, received, or forwarded sexually explicit photos 
through text message or email). 
26 CBS NEWS, supra note 24. 
27 Id. 
28 Alex Tresniowski et al., Tormented to Death?, PEOPLE, Oct. 18, 2010, at 56, 56. 
29 Id. 
30 See Bennett, supra note 2, at 39. (acknowledging the ‘dozens of articles that have called 
bullying a “pandemic”). 
31 20/20 (ABC television broadcast Oct. 15, 2010), available at 
http://abc.go.com/watch/2020/SH559026/VD5592259/bullied-to-death-victims-stories. 
32 See Kevin Turbert, Note, Faceless Bullies: Legislative and Judicial Responses to 
Cyberbullying, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 651, 652 (2009) (“Playground bullies have exchanged 
their brute-force tactics for electronic weapons.”). 
33 See What is Cyberbullying?, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, 
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying/what-is-cyberbullying (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) 
(noting that cyberbullying is viewed as more extreme by the victim because it occurs in his or 
her home). 
34 This First Amendment discussion applies only to public schools. The First Amendment 
only protects against government speech restrictions. Because private schools are not state 
actors, the protections in the Bill of Rights do not apply. ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: 
THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 35 (2009). 
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speech when it materially or substantially disrupts the work and 
discipline of the school or invades the rights of others under Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District.35 Part III 
explains that the majority of lower courts have extended the Tinker 
standard to off-campus speech. These holdings suggest that, because 
it ostensibly occurs within the school environment, cyberbullying can 
be regulated by school officials as student speech. But, Part IV argues 
that this approach is misguided, resulting from the application of the 
Tinker standard to circumstances that the Supreme Court never 
intended, and that schools, in fact, lack the constitutional authority to 
regulate off-campus student Internet speech. Finally, Part V explores 
alternative methods to combat cyberbullying and proposes a 
legislative approach that would compel schools to promote awareness 
within their communities and implement stringent on-campus 
bullying policies. The inclusion of such a model policy could also 
clarify the line between constitutionally protected speech and 
unprotected bullying that is subject to school discipline. 
I. THE CYBERBULLYING PROBLEM 
The Center for Safe and Responsible Use of the Internet defines 
cyberbullying as “being cruel to others by sending or posting harmful 
material or engaging in other forms of social cruelty using the Internet 
or other digital technologies.”36 Cyberbullying takes many forms: a 
bully may create a website that makes fun of the victim, circulate 
cruel or harmful material about the victim, or exclude the victim from 
buddy lists and chat rooms.37 Bullying of any kind may result in 
depression, anxiety, chronic illness, poor self-esteem, substance 
abuse, family problems, and suicidal ideation.38 Moreover, victims of 
cyberbullying are nearly twice as likely to commit suicide as 
compared to the general population.39  
Cyberbullying is more harmful than traditional bullying for several 
reasons. For instance, online content is “harder to wash away than 
                                                                                                                 
35 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
36 Nancy Willard, Cyberbullying Legislation and School Policies: Where Are the 
Boundaries of the ‘Schoolhouse Gate’ in the New Virtual World?, CTR. FOR SAFE & 
RESPONSIBLE INTERNET USE 1 (Mar. 2007), http://csriu.org/cyberbully/docs/cblegislation.pdf. 
37 See NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 33. 
38 See Id. (describing the effects cyberbullying may have on victims); Turbert, supra note 
32, at 655 (relating research findings which show that bullying may cause depression, anxiety, 
and other ailments). 
39 Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, Battling the Bullies; West Islip Girl Scout Makes her Points at 
House Hearing; Tells of a Classmate Who Suffered From Online Attack, NEWSDAY, June 25, 
2010, at A08. 
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comments scrawled on a bathroom wall,”40 and its cruelty thus 
constantly plagues its victim.41 Cyberbullying’s victims are also 
unable to escape torment, even in their own home42 and may be in 
perpetual fear of another attack.43 This anxiety often results in poor 
academic performance and increased absences from school.44 
Moreover, because cyberbullies can cloak their identities through 
screen names and e-mail addresses, victims may not even know who 
is tormenting them,45 which can add to the anonymity that often 
motivates the bullying in the first place, and transforms school into an 
unwelcome and unsafe environment.46 
Cyberbullying’s electronic medium can also lead bullies to be 
crueler to their victims. Because cyberbullying occurs “from a 
physically distant location . . .  the bully does [not] . . .  see the 
immediate response of the target.”47 As a result, cyber-attacks can be 
particularly brutal. Psychologists have concluded that “‘the [physical] 
distance between bully and victim . . .  is leading to an 
unprecedented—and often unintentional—degree of brutality, 
especially when combined with a typical adolescent’s lack of impulse 
control and underdeveloped empathy skills.’”48 
Finally, unlike in the lunchroom or on the playground, there is 
little supervision in cyberspace.49 Parents who lack technological 
savvy may not realize that their children are bullies.50 Even if parents 
discover that their son or daughter is harassing another student 
                                                                                                                 
40 Bennett, supra note 2, at 39–40. 
41 See SHAHEEN SHARIFF, CONFRONTING CYBER-BULLYING: WHAT SCHOOLS NEED TO 
KNOW TO CONTROL MISCONDUCT AND AVOID LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 45 (2009) (“[O]nline 
communications have a permanence and inseparability that is difficult to erase.”). 
42 NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 33 (“Being bullied at home can take 
away the place children feel most safe.”). 
43 See Karly Zande, When the School Bully Attacks in the Living Room: Using Tinker to 
Regulate Off-Campus Student Cyberbullying, 13 BARRY L. REV. 103, 112 (2009) 
(“[Cyberbullying] [v]ictims may be in constant fear for their safety . . . .”).  
44 SHARIFF, supra note 41, at 37. 
45 See id. at 44 (“Fear of unknown cyber perpetrators among classmates and bullying that 
continues at school distracts all students . . . from schoolwork.”). 
46 SHARIFF, supra note 41, at 44. 
47 Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying: Identification, Prevention, and 
Response, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR. 2 (2010), 
http://www.cyberbullying.us/Cyberbullying_Identification_Prevention_Response_Fact_Sheet.p
df.; see also Kelleher, supra note 39 (“[Bullies] don’t have to look their target in the eye.”). 
48 Turbert, supra note 32, at 654 (quoting Amy Harmon, Internet Gives Teenage Bullies 
Weapons to Wound From Afar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A1). 
49 Zande, supra note 43, at 110. 
50 See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 47, at 2 (noting that many adults lack the 
technological know-how to monitor their children’s Internet use); Dr. Phil Takes Up Cyber-
Bullying Fight, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2010, 3:06 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/24/earlyshow/main6613649.shtml (noting that 
modern children are more computer literate than their parents). 
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through the Internet or a cell phone, they may believe that bullying is 
a common form of schoolyard behavior.51 Moreover, victims of 
cyberbullying may find it difficult to disclose their victimization.52 
Dominique Napolitano, a fifteen-year-old who testified before a 
House committee on the issue in June 2010, explained that victims 
are afraid that the bullying will become worse if they seek help from 
an adult.53 Unfortunately, when parents, schools, and communities 
fail to intervene—because of unfamiliarity with modern technology, 
indifference toward the situation, or any other reason—children learn 
that such behavior is tolerable.54  
The number of students who fall victim to cyberbullying is unclear 
because of definitional uncertainty and significant variation among 
research findings.55 One fact, however, is clear—cyberbullying is a 
major societal problem without a simple solution. If school officials 
attempt to restrict cyberbullying to protect some of their students, 
they risk infringing upon the First Amendment rights of others.  
II. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Even though cyberbullying has harmful, and sometimes deadly, 
consequences, even bullies have constitutional rights. Internet speech 
may be entitled to First Amendment protection. Schools must, 
therefore, have the constitutional authority to regulate this expression 
if they wish to address the cyberbullying problem.56 
Students are “persons” under the Constitution and are thus 
unquestionably entitled to free speech rights. In Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District,57 the Supreme Court 
famously held that “[i]t can hardly be argued that . . .  students . . .  
                                                                                                                 
51 See Cindy Gallagher, Sticks and Stones Have Remedies at Law—It is Name-Calling 
That Hurts Kids: Can State Anti-Bullying Statutes Really Help Kids Who Are Victims of In-
School Bullying?, 4 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 21, 24 (2002) (noting that cultural and social 
norms discourage school personnel from reprimanding students for inappropriate bullying 
because they are “just being kids”). 
52 Kelleher, supra note 39. 
53 Id. (“[T]hey’re afraid things will get worse. . . . Am I going to be cyberbullied even 
more because of it?”) (quotation omitted). 
54 See id. (failure of school district to intervene suggests approval). 
55 See Stop Cyberbullying Before it Starts, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, 
http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/bullying/cyberbullying.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) 
[hereinafter Stop Cyberbullying] (finding that 43 percent of teens have been cyberbullied in the 
past year); Bennett, supra note 2 (reporting that twenty percent of American students are bullied 
each year); Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 47, at 1 (noting the wide variation in survey 
estimates, from ten to forty percent or more, of the number of youths experiencing 
cyberbullying). 
56 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
57 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate.”58 In fact, the First Amendment plays an 
important role in public education. As the Supreme Court noted in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents59: 
The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere 
more vital than in the community of American schools. The 
classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. The 
Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers 
truth out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any 
kind of authoritative selection.60 
On the other hand, the right to free speech is not boundless.61 
While the First Amendment may protect speech that promotes 
different perspectives in the classroom, it may not insulate a bully’s 
japes from punishment. It would seem absurd to argue that the future 
of our nation depends upon allowing bullies to harass their classmates 
and disrupt the learning environment.62 Thus, the law must draw a 
delicate line between student speech that promotes First Amendment 
interests and that which does not.63  
The Supreme Court made this distinction in Tinker. In that case, a 
group of students planned to express their opposition to the Vietnam 
War by wearing black armbands to school.64 When school officials 
became aware of the plan, they adopted a policy stating that any 
student wearing a black armband to school would first be asked to 
remove it and then suspended if he or she refused to do so.65 In 
considering the constitutionality of this school policy, the Court 
created the Tinker standard: schools can regulate student speech only 
                                                                                                                 
58 Id. at 506; see also id. at 511 (“Students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ 
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, 
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.”). 
59 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
60 Id. at 603 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“[S]tudents must always remain free to inquire, to study 
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate 
and die.”). 
61 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[T]he right of free 
speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”). 
62 See Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“There is no constitutional right to be a bully.”). 
63 See DUPRE, supra note 34, at 2 (identifying the conflict between “the rights of 
individual students to speak . . . [and] the rights of other students to learn”). 
64 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). Five children 
were involved in the protest. The younger children, aged eight and eleven, were left out of the 
case for fear the court would question whether they had their own political views or were acting 
at the direction of their parents. DUPRE, supra note 34, at 26. 
65 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
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when it “materially or substantially disrupt[s] the work and discipline 
of the school.”66 To satisfy this burden, schools must show “more 
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”67 On the facts before it, 
the Court found that the school could not make this showing and, 
therefore, its armband prohibition violated the students’ First 
Amendment right to free speech.68  
Courts commonly view Tinker as the default standard to apply in 
student speech cases, unless the facts fall within one of three 
categories authorizing schools to constitutionally restrict their 
students’ speech even absent a material disruption. The first category, 
articulated in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,69 allows a 
school to prohibit speech if the speech is vulgar or lewd and “would 
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”70 The speech at 
issue in Bethel involved sexually explicit metaphors in an address at a 
school assembly.71 While the Court recognized an “undoubted 
freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools 
and classrooms,” it ultimately found that the student’s innuendo 
crossed the line of socially acceptable behavior.72 Hence, “it was 
perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the 
point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly 
inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school 
education.”73 
The second category, found in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier,74 permits schools to exercise control over school-
sponsored speech if their actions are “reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”75 In Hazelwood, a high school principal 
redacted student articles on teen pregnancy and divorce from a 
school-sponsored newspaper.76 The Court considered it a decisive 
factor that readers could perceive the speech as school-sponsored, 
                                                                                                                 
66 Id. at 513. A consensus has emerged among lower courts that Tinker also includes 
threats of material or substantial disruption; see, e.g., Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 
383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that student speech at issue “falls well short 
of the Tinker standard for reasonably anticipating a disruption of school activities”); see also 
Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1129, 
1152 n.140 (2009) (noting that Tinker created a reasonable anticipation test). 
67 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
68 Id. at 514. 
69 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
70 Id. at 685. 
71 Id. at 677–78. 
72 Id. at 681. 
73 Id. at 685–86. 
74 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
75 Id. at 273. 
76 Id. at 264. 
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noting that “[a] school must be able to set high standards for the 
student speech that is disseminated under its auspices . . . .”77 
The Court’s third category, found in Morse v. Frederick,78 permits 
schools to “take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from 
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug 
use.”79 In Morse, a principal forced a student to take down a fourteen-
foot banner unfurled at a school-sponsored event that read “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS.”80 The Court permitted the principal’s action and 
held that the principal did not violate the First Amendment by 
confiscating the banner and suspending the student.81 
These cases leave many questions unanswered for school officials 
attempting to solve the cyberbullying dilemma. Most significantly: 
does the Tinker standard apply to off-campus Internet speech? In each 
of the cases discussed above, the student conduct took place on 
campus82 or at a school-sponsored event.83 While the Court could 
have addressed off-campus speech in Morse, as the banner was 
displayed at an off-campus field trip, it explicitly chose not to do so.84 
Many lower courts have attempted to resolve this unanswered 
question. Unfortunately, as Part III of this Note demonstrates, they 
have not reached a clear consensus. 
III. LOWER COURTS APPLYING TINKER TO OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT 
SPEECH 
Although most courts view Tinker as the default standard in 
student-speech cases,85 federal courts generally disagree as to whether 
the standard applies to off-campus, Internet speech. For example, on 
February 4, 2010, two different panels of the United States Court of 
                                                                                                                 
77 Id. at 271–72. 
78 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 397. 
81 Id. 
82 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263–64 (1988) (students wrote 
articles for a school-sponsored newspaper disseminated at school); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986) (student gave inappropriate speech during a school 
assembly); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (students 
wore black armbands to school). 
83 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (student unfurled a banner at a school-sponsored event that 
was held during normal school hours). 
84 See id. at 401 (“There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts 
should apply school speech precedents, but not on these facts.”) (citations omitted). 
85 Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students are “Persons” Under Our 
Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2009) (“Most courts 
continue to recognize Tinker as supplying the default standard under which regulation of student 
expression is to be judged unless the facts fit one of the relatively narrow exceptions carved out 
by the Supreme Court.”).  
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Appeals for the Third Circuit handed down contradictory decisions 
regarding the First Amendment’s protection of student-created, 
parody Myspace profiles of their school principals.86 Most courts 
have held that schools can restrict students’ off-campus speech, 
though none have addressed cyberbullying in particular.87 These 
Third Circuit decisions, however, exemplify the confusion that 
continues to surround the issue of students’ off-campus, Internet 
speech.  
Those in support of extending Tinker to regulate off-campus 
student Internet speech employ the conventional “substantial 
disruption” test to justify such a result. One justification views Tinker 
through a modern perspective.88 Tinker considered the school 
environment as it was in 1969—when the country was in the midst of 
an antiwar, free-speech movement,89 but the school landscape has 
changed dramatically since that time. One commentator noted that 
“the Internet marks [a] landscape change as dramatically as the Front 
Range marks the end of the Great Plain.”90 In light of modern 
technology, the idea that the school environment described in Tinker 
now extends to cyberspace has become quite popular.91  
Proponents of this position also focus on the consequences of the 
expression rather than the physical location where it occurred. They 
                                                                                                                 
86 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated en banc, 650 
F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), was handed down the same day as Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 
593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’d 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011); see infra notes 150–53 and 
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of Layshock. The Third Circuit, sitting en 
banc, has since reheard both cases in an effort to resolve the confusion surrounding the 
conflicting decisions. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011); Layshock 
v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011). 
87 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (holding that schools may regulate student speech if the speech 
materially disrupts school work and discipline). In addition to the material disruption test, 
Tinker also appears to allow the restriction of student speech where it “colli[des] with the rights 
of other students to be secure and to be let alone.” Id. at 508. In Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. 
Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used this standard to uphold a ban on T-shirts 
denouncing homosexuality from a school campus. The court concluded that the T-shirt 
“collide[d] with the rights of other students in the most fundamental way.” 445 F.3d at 1178 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). Harper is the only reported case that relies on the 
second factor of Tinker to regulate student speech; it also lacks precedential value. See County 
of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 n.6 (1979) (noting that “vacating the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s opinion of precedential effect”) (internal quotation 
and citation omitted). 
88 That same environment now extends to cyberspace, far beyond the actual campus. See 
SHARIFF, supra note 41, at 117 (explaining that the school environment is “no longer restricted 
to the campus”). 
89 Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still Standing, 58 
AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1185 (2009). 
90 DUPRE, supra note 34, at 231 (citation omitted). 
91 See, e.g., Zande, supra note 43, at 133 (arguing that the Tinker standard should be 
applied to cyberspeech and off-campus student speech). 
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assert that no distinction should be made between on-campus and off-
campus speech. As Judge Newman of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit argued in a concurring opinion, 
“territoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the 
limit of [a school’s] authority.”92  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
advanced an argument similar to Newman’s in Wisniewski v. Board of 
Education.93 In that case, a school punished a student who created an 
online chat icon suggesting the execution-style murder of his English 
teacher.94 The student created the icon off-campus, and it came to the 
attention of school officials only after another student supplied the 
teacher with a copy.95 The court, applying Tinker, found that the 
school could punish the student for creating the icon because it 
represented a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption 
within the school environment, despite the fact that the expression 
occurred off campus.96 
The Second Circuit also applied the “foreseeable risk of substantial 
disruption” test in Doninger v. Niehoff.97 In Doninger, school 
officials’ decision to postpone an annual battle-of-the-bands concert 
that Student Council members had planned led a student to criticize 
the “douchebags in [the] central office” on her publicly-accessible 
blog. 98 School administrators received numerous phone calls in 
response to the post,99 which contributed to the court’s conclusion 
that the post “created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the 
work and discipline of the school” and, therefore, that the school 
could discipline the student.100 
Similarly, in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District,101 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that a school 
                                                                                                                 
92 Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., 
concurring in judgment); see also Zande, supra note 43, at 133 (“[S]chool[s] should be able to 
punish . . . cyberbully[ing] regardless of the physical location where it occurred.”). 
93 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
94 Id. at 36. The icon depicted a pistol firing a bullet at someone’s head and splattered 
blood. The words “‘Kill Mr. VanderMolen’” appeared below. Id. 
95 Id. at 35–36. 
96 Id. at 40. 
97 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
98 Id. at 45. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 53. This case also yielded significant precedent with respect to qualified 
immunity. The Second Circuit held that, because the student’s First Amendment free speech 
rights were not clearly established at the time of the incident, the principal and superintendent 
were entitled to qualified immunity. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 356 (2d Cir. 2011). 
Under the relevant test, the court found that it was objectively reasonable for these school 
officials to conclude that the student’s post was potentially disruptive to the degree required by 
Tinker. Id. at 348–49. 
101 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010) vacated en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011). The Third 
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“need not wait until a substantial disruption actually occurs,” but may 
meet its burden by “demonstrate[ing] any facts which might 
reasonably have led [it] to forecast substantial disruption of or 
material interference with school activities.”102 In that case, the court 
allowed the suspension of a middle-school student who created a 
Myspace profile of her principal. Even though the profile was created 
entirely off-campus,103 it could be accessed only from an off-campus 
location,104 and had caused no actual disruption,105 the court found no 
First Amendment violation because, based on the threat of substantial 
disruption, the school was entitled to punish the student for creating 
the profile.106 
Finally, in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,107 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the suspension 
of a student who bullied her classmate with a Myspace page called 
“Students Against Sluts Herpes” because her speech interfered with 
the work and discipline of the school.108 The court reasoned that, 
although the student created the page at home, she knew that her 
message would be heard by other students and that the fallout “would 
be felt in the school itself.”109 In rendering its decision, the Fourth 
Circuit seemed particularly concerned with the “mean spirited and 
hateful” nature of the page and noted that bullying “must be taken 
seriously by school administrators . . . .”110  
Federal courts have also expressed their willingness to sanction 
schools’ regulation of off-campus expression under Tinker had the 
school established an actual disruption. In Killion v. Franklin 
Regional School District,111 for example, a student published a top-
ten list about his school’s athletic director in an e-mail commenting 
                                                                                                                 
 
Circuit, sitting en banc, subsequently held that the school district violated the student’s First 
Amendment free speech rights when it suspended her for creating the Myspace profile. J.S. v. 
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 931 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court explained that “[t]he 
facts simply do not support the conclusion that the School District could have reasonably 
forecasted a substantial disruption of or material interference with the school as a result of [the] 
profile.” Id. at *11. 
102 J.S., 593 F.3d at 298 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 514 (1969)).  
103 Id. at 291. The student created the profile entirely from her home. Id. 
104 Id. at 292. The Middle School computers blocked access to MySpace. Id. 
105 See id. at 299 (finding that the profile created minor inconveniences rather than a 
substantial disruption). 
106 Id. at 303. 
107 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
108 Id. at 572–73. 
109 Id. at 573. 
110 Id. at 577. 
111 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
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on the relationship between the administrator’s weight and his 
genitalia.112 The United States District Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania compared the situation to J.S. v. Bethlehem Area 
School District,113 in which the teacher was so traumatized by a 
website created about her that she was forced to take medical 
sabbatical for the next year.114 Applying the Tinker standard, the 
Killion court determined that the school was not entitled to suspend 
the student because it had shown no actual disruption.115 As compared 
to Bethlehem, the speech was not threatening and did not cause the 
teacher to take a leave of absence.116 
IV. THESE COURTS ARE MISGUIDED 
Many courts utilize the “substantial disruption” test to justify the 
constitutionality of schools’ punishment of off-campus student 
speech. The Court in Tinker, however, did not so much as hint that 
the standard should be applied to off-campus speech.117 Conversely, 
the Court relied exclusively on on-campus scenarios and locations in 
reaching its decision: 
A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the 
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the 
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, 
he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects 
like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially 
and substantially interfering with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and 
without colliding with the rights of others.118 
Moreover, while the expression in Morse took place off school 
property, no Justice seriously contended that the students were 
anywhere but at a school-sponsored event.119 Student Internet speech, 
                                                                                                                 
112 Id. at 448. The list contained statements such as “[b]ecause of his extensive gut factor, 
the ‘man’ hasn’t seen his own penis in over a decade.” Id. 
113 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
114 Id. at 852. 
115 Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
116 Id. 
117 See Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the 
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 270 (2001) (noting that the 
Tinker court “never suggested that [its] limitation on students’ speech rights applied outside of 
the school setting . . . ”). 
118 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (emphasis added) 
(internal citation and quotation omitted); see also Calvert, supra note 89, at 1177 (noting that 
the Court reasoned with on-campus scenarios and on-campus locations during school hours 
when adopting its “substantial disruption” test). 
119 DUPRE, supra note 34, at 241. 
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on the other hand, occurs almost exclusively off campus and during 
non-school hours. The Supreme Court has never held that schools 
may regulate such speech. 
Schools should not be permitted to punish a child for the words 
that he utters in his home solely because he or she is a student. The 
Supreme Court has allowed schools remarkable deference in the 
management of on-campus speech.120 Judges are far removed from, 
and thus less inclined to interfere with, the day-to-day operations of 
schools.121 However, school officials could abuse this discretion if 
they were able to regulate off-campus speech. Former law clerk and 
current Harvard professor Martha Field122 expressed concern to the 
Tinker Court that “school officials [could] hypothesize the requisite 
likelihood of disorder for anything that they [did not] like, for 
whatever reason, including reasons that violate the First Amendment, 
and administer a highly discriminatory system.”123  
This fear is easily realized by allowing the limited First 
Amendment analysis afforded to student speech made on campus to 
follow a student home merely because of his or her status as a 
student.124 Schools could prohibit students from discussing entire 
topics, such as opinions about teachers or administrators, when in the 
privacy of their own homes.125 Additionally, “there would be little to 
prevent school officials from regulating adult speech uttered in the 
community.”126 After all, “[a]dults often say things that give rise to 
substantial disruptions in public schools.”127 Certainly the Tinker 
Court would not have endorsed these results.128 
                                                                                                                 
120 See LoMonte, supra note 85, at 1354; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (Those officials involved in the educational process perform 
“important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions . . . .”). 
121 See DUPRE, supra note 34, at 17 (noting that, while most judges and justices are “better 
educated than most teachers and principals,” they are “not trained to run schools, and they are 
far removed from the day-to-day problems in the classroom”). 
122 Faculty Directory, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=19 (last visited Sept. 15, 2011). 
123 Bowman, supra note 66, at 1160 (citation omitted). 
124 See LoMonte, supra note 85, at 1326 (criticizing those courts that have “accept[ed] 
uncritically the proposition that the special First Amendment infirmities under which students 
labor on school premises during school time follow these young people everywhere they go by 
dint of their student status”); id. at 1355 (observing that the unique student/school relationship 
seems to be recognized only where uniqueness works to disadvantage the speaker). 
125 Id. at 1355; see also J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 939 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Smith, J., concurring in judgment) (“Applying Tinker to off-campus speech would create a 
precedent with ominous implications. Doing so would empower schools to regulate students’ 
expressive activity no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it 
involves—so long as it causes a substantial disruption at school.”). 
126 Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (Smith, J., concurring in judgment).  
127 Id. 
128 See Calvert, supra note 89, at 1175 (“[S]ome lower courts are now using—misusing, 
really—Tinker in a situation and scenario that the Court in 1969 could hardly have imagined.”). 
 11/6/2011 4:02:30 PM 
2011] COMBATING CYBERBULLYING 249 
Parents, not schools, should punish children for their off-campus 
expression,129 unless the children intend for their speech to reach 
school grounds. As one commentator has argued, “[s]chools must not 
be allowed to usurp control from parents over the off-campus speech 
and off-campus behavior of their children simply because such speech 
or behavior relates to or is somehow about other students or 
administrators.”130 When children are away from school property and 
not engaged in school-sponsored activities, they are not students. 
They are, rather, “minors under parental control and supervision.”131 
Provided that children do not deliberately and physically disseminate 
their off-campus speech on campus, students should be afforded the 
same constitutional protections as non-students.132 
A handful of courts have adopted this stance. The Second Circuit’s 
decision in Thomas v. Board of Education,133 the Fifth Circuit’s 
Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board,134 and Layshock v. 
Hermitage School District135 all analyzed issues of off-campus 
student expression and ultimately did not permit the regulation of 
such expression.136 Moreover, in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School 
District,137 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
sitting en banc, reversed and remanded the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania’s ruling that suspension was an appropriate punishment 
for a student who created a fake Myspace profile that made fun of her 
middle school principal.138 As discussed above, a Third Circuit panel 
had previously upheld the suspension.139  
                                                                                                                 
129 See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ,, 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[S]chool officials . . 
. are not empowered to assume the character of parens patriae”); see also Turbert, supra note 
32, at 678 (“[W]hen a school punishes a student’s at-home online activity, is its intervention 
blurring the separation of power between school authority and parental authority?”). 
130 Calvert, supra note 89, at 1178. 
131 Id. at 1179. 
132 See LoMonte, supra note 85, at 1354 (“[O]ff-campus speech by students . . . stands on 
the same footing as speech by any other citizen, so long as the student does not physically 
disseminate the speech on campus.”); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding that absent a constitutionally valid reason for regulation, 
students are entitled to express their views). 
133 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). 
134 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004). 
135 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
sitting en banc, vacated its original decision and reached a result similar to that of the initial 
panel. The court held that the school district violated the student’s First Amendment free speech 
rights when it disciplined him for creating the profile. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 
F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
136 See infra notes 137–53 and accompanying text. 
137 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
138 Id. at 920. 
139 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010) vacated en banc, 650 
F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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Thomas involved a handful of students who were suspended for 
publishing an underground newspaper addressed to the school 
community.140 The students stored the publication in a closet at 
school and occasionally typed the articles within the school.141 
However, the Second Circuit was satisfied that most of the work was 
done in the students’ homes, off-campus, and after school hours. The 
court reasoned “[t]hat a few articles were transcribed on school 
typewriters, and that the finished product was secretly and 
unobtrusively stored in a teacher’s closet [did] not alter the fact that 
[the magazine] was conceived, executed, and distributed outside the 
school.”142 In making a distinction between parental and school 
discipline, the court noted that activities such as this fall outside the 
jurisdiction of school officials143 and that school discipline must be 
confined to the “metes and bounds of the school itself.”144  
The student expression in Porter similarly fell within the 
protection of the First Amendment. The student in that case drew a 
violent illustration at home that depicted his school campus under 
siege.145 The sketch was concealed in his closet for two years and 
only inadvertently taken to school by his brother.146 School 
administrators responded by allowing the student to enroll in an 
alternative school conditioned on his waiving his right to an expulsion 
hearing.147 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
found that the case fell outside the scope of Tinker and, even if a 
substantial disruption had ensued, the school overstepped its 
bounds.148 The student “never intended [his sketch] to be brought to 
campus” and “took no action to . . . publicize[] in a way certain to 
result in its appearance [on-campus].”149 
Moreover, in Layshock, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit found that the First Amendment protected a high school 
student who was suspended for creating a Myspace profile of his 
                                                                                                                 
140 Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045(2d Cir. 1979). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 1050. 
143 See id. at 1051 (“[T]he First Amendment forbids public school administrators and 
teachers from regulating the material to which a child is exposed after he leaves school each 
afternoon. . . . The risk is simply too great that school officials will punish protected speech and 
thereby inhibit future expression.”) (emphasis added). 
144 Id. at 1052. The court noted that it could envision a case in which students incite 
substantial disruption within the school from some other location. However, under the facts of 
the case at bar, there was no threat of such disruption. Id. at 1052 n.17. 
145 Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 612. 
148 See id. at 615 (“This is not exactly speech on campus or even speech directed at 
campus.”). 
149 Id. at 615, 620. 
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principal.150 The student created the profile at home, but used school 
computers to show his classmates.151 The Third Circuit determined 
that “[i]t would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the 
state in the guise of school authorities to reach into a child’s home 
and control his/her actions there to the same extent that they can 
control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored 
activities.”152 The court expressed reluctance to expand the arm of 
school authority beyond the school, although the circumstances of the 
case did not require that the parameters of this authority be defined.153  
Finally, in Blue Mountain, the Third Circuit held that the school 
district violated a middle-school student’s First Amendment speech 
rights when it suspended her for speech that “caused no substantial 
disruption in school and that could not reasonably have led school 
officials to forecast substantial disruption in school.”154 The court 
found it significant that the student did not even intend for the speech 
to reach the school and, in fact, “took specific steps to make the 
profile ‘private’ so that only her friends could access it.”155 The court 
noted that “[t]he fact that her friends happen to be [classmates] is not 
surprising, and does not mean that [her] speech targeted the 
school.”156 
Admittedly, the sting of words transmitted from a home computer 
or cell phone is often felt within the school and may even result in a 
substantial disruption.157 However, using the “substantial disruption” 
test to regulate off-campus student expression severely undermines 
the First Amendment.158 As one commentator has noted, “an overuse 
of the Tinker justification against off-campus cyberbullying could 
lead to an abuse of school power and chill student conduct that is 
normally protected under the Constitution.”159 Another argued that 
subjecting off-campus student speakers to punishment merely because 
their expression rouses the school community “poses an intolerable 
threat to the First Amendment rights of students.”160 The misuse of 
                                                                                                                 
150 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 2010). 
151 Id. at 252–53. 
152 Id. at 260. 
153 Id. at 263. The Third Circuit found no evidence that the profile resulted in a substantial 
disruption and the school district did not object thereto. Therefore, the school could not justify 
its punishment of the student under Tinker. Id. 
154 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
155 Id. at 930. 
156 Id. at 930–31. 
157 See SHARIFF, supra note 41, at 37 (noting that victims of cyberbullying often display 
poor academic performance and school avoidance in response to the online attacks). 
158 See Calvert, supra note 117, at 287 (“[T]he school’s own internal discipline system . . .    
must be reined in before First Amendment rights are needlessly sacrificed.”) 
159 Turbert, supra note 32, at 678. 
160 Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not Grounds: Protecting Student Internet Speech, 
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Tinker to regulate off-campus student Internet speech is inconsistent 
with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court. Such expression 
should instead be afforded the full protection of the First 
Amendment.161 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
Although schools should lack the constitutional authority to 
regulate off-campus student speech under most circumstances, society 
may address the cyberbullying problem through the criminal justice 
system, the civil justice system, and, preferably, through education. 
Below, this Note analyzes the prospect that the criminal and civil 
justice systems will provide adequate remedies, and finds that they do 
not. 
A. The Criminal Justice System 
The ever-increasing media hype around cyberbullying has led to 
demands for more drastic punishment, and the government has 
responded accordingly.162 After Phoebe Prince’s suicide, the district 
attorney charged the teens who bullied her with felony charges 
ranging from stalking to criminal harassment.163 The individuals 
responsible for the Internet broadcast that drove Tyler Clementi to 
jump from the George Washington Bridge faced an invasion-of- 
privacy charge, but may also find themselves defending against a hate 
crime indictment.164 These two cases demonstrate that the criminal 
justice system is one method by which society may deter 
cyberbullying. 
“The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free 
trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people 
                                                                                                                 
 
89 VA. L. REV. 139, 187 (2003). 
161 Id. at 159 (“Both policy and logic demand that internet speech be clearly classified as 
off-campus speech and afforded the full protection of the First Amendment.”). 
162 Jessica Bennett, Is the ‘Bullying Epidemic’ a Media Myth?, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 1, 
2010, 9:43 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/10/01/is-the-bullying-
epidemic-a-media-myth.html [hereinafter Media Myth] (describing arguments for and against 
creating new punishments for cyberbullying); see also Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made 
Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at A1 (reporting that chairman Steven 
Goldstein of Garden State Equality viewed the recent cyber-bullying related death of gay 
college student, Tyler Clementi, as a hate crime). 
163 Setoodeh, supra note 1, at 60–63. In May 2011, the teens were placed on probation. 
Despite the lenient sentences, David Sullivan, the regional district attorney, said that the 
prosecution nonetheless sent the message that “bullying and harassment will not be tolerated in 
our schools.” Erick Eckholm, 3 Ex-Students Get Probation in Bullying Linked to a Suicide, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 2011, at A19. 
164 Tresniowski, supra note 28, at 56. 
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might find distasteful or discomforting.”165 The Supreme Court has 
consistently held, however, that the right to free speech is not 
limitless.166 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,167 for instance, the 
Court held that a state may punish those words “which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
peace.”168 That case involved a public speech denouncing all religion 
as a racket.169 When confronted by a city marshal, Chaplinsky called 
the man a “God-damned racketeer” and “a damned fascist.”170 He was 
subsequently convicted under a New Hampshire incitement statute.171 
In upholding the conviction, the Court reasoned that some words are 
“of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.”172 Under Chaplinsky, therefore, students could 
face criminal sanctions if they communicate words that would cause 
an average addressee to fight.173 But because the Supreme Court has 
limited the fighting words doctrine to face-to-face confrontation,174 
however, the criminal sanctions implicated thereby would be limited 
to traditional instances of bullying, making it inapposite to Internet 
cyberbullying. 
                                                                                                                 
165 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
166 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”) 
167 315 U.S. 568. 
168 Id. at 572. 
169 Id. at 569–70. 
170 Id. at 569. 
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 572. 
173 See Id. at 573–74 (applying a standard of whether epithets would be likely to cause an 
average person to retaliate in upholding the challenged statute). The likelihood that a fighting 
words charge would succeed is unclear. Free-speech expert Robert O’Neil criticized the 
Chaplinsky decision in that it “has caused no end of confusion during the ensuing six decades.” 
Robert M. O’Neil, Rights in Conflict: The First Amendment’s Third Century, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2002, at 7, 18. However, because courts often consider the 
circumstances surrounding the verbal assault, a fighting words charge is more likely to stick if 
the words are accompanied by threatening conduct. David L. Hudson Jr., Fighting Words, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CTR., 
http://archive.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/personal/topic.aspx?topic=fighting_words (July 
2009).  
174 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The defendant in Cohen was observed 
outside a courthouse wearing a jacket that said “Fuck the Draft.” Id. at 16. The Supreme Court 
rejected application of the fighting words doctrine in that the jacket was not a face-to-face 
personal insult. Id. at 20. “While the four-letter word displayed by Cohen in relation to the draft 
is not uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in this instance it was clearly 
not directed to the person of the hearer. No individual actually or likely to be present could 
reasonably have regarded the words on [his] jacket as a direct personal insult.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Cyberbullies could also face criminal liability under the true threat 
doctrine. “True threats” include those statements which 
“communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”175 The Supreme Court has determined that such speech 
is beyond the protection of the First Amendment. The Court first 
discussed true threats in Watts v. United States.176 In that case, 
Respondent told a crowd of demonstrators that “[i]f they ever make 
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”177 
The Court concluded that this statement constituted a constitutionally 
protected political hyperbole rather than a true threat against the 
President.178 More recently, in Virginia v. Black,179 the Court found 
that a Virginia criminal statute did not violate the First Amendment 
insofar as it banned cross burning with intent to intimidate. Cross 
burning is almost certain to inspire fear of bodily harm and, 
accordingly, the court held that a ban on such conduct is permissible 
under the First Amendment.180 Unfortunately, outside of Watts and 
Black, the Court has offered little guidance as to what constitutes a 
true threat. 
Many courts have employed the reasonable person standard when 
determining whether a statement amounts to a true threat.181 Under 
the reasonable person standard, courts look to whether a reasonable 
person would interpret the threat as a serious expression of intent to 
cause harm.182 Factors relevant to this determination may include the 
reaction of the recipient, whether the threat was conditional, and how 
the threat was communicated.183 In Doe v. Pulaski County Special 
School District,184 a student prepared two violent and obscenity-laced 
letters to an ex-girlfriend expressing a desire to molest, rape, and 
murder her.185 The student prepared both letters in his home, where 
they remained until they were discovered by another student.186 That 
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student took one of the letters and delivered it to the female 
student.187 The court concluded that, because “a reasonable recipient 
would have perceived [the] letter as a serious expression of intent to 
harm” the female student, they amounted to a true threat.188  
In addition to the incitement and true-threat doctrines, cyberbullies 
could face criminal liability for harassment and stalking. In Phoebe 
Prince’s case, the District Attorney decided to bring criminal charges 
for harassment and stalking against those who had bullied Phoebe 
after an investigation revealed conduct that “far exceeded the limits of 
normal teenage relationship-related quarrels.”189 This unprecedented 
move caused quite a stir in the small Massachusetts town. The 
superintendent of South Hadley schools was surprised that the District 
Attorney drew such a strong connection between the bullying and 
suicide.190 Others, including parents whose children were also bullied, 
were pleased that the District Attorney brought the charges.191 
There are clearly methods under existing criminal law by which 
cyberbullies can be punished. However, most attacks by cyberbullies, 
despite their injurious consequences, do not rise to the level of 
criminal conduct.192 One proposed solution is to cast a wider net. The 
Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act,193 for instance, sought to 
make cyberbullying a federal crime. Representative Linda Sánchez, 
primary author of the bill, argued before the Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security that law enforcement needs the 
tools to punish “serious, repeated, and hostile communications . . . 
.”194 Under her bill, it would be a federal offense to “transmit[] in 
interstate or foreign commerce any communication, with the intent to 
coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a 
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person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and 
hostile behavior . . . .”195 
The strong arm of criminal law can certainly deter and punish 
some instances of cyberbullying, but cyberbullying raises unique 
issues that criminalization fails to address.196 Nancy Willard, Director 
for the Center for Safe and Responsible Internet Use, noted during the 
congressional hearing that criminalization would actually detract from 
prevention efforts.197 Willard argued that it is more important to 
invest in comprehensive, in-depth prevention and intervention efforts 
to stop the behavior from occurring in the first place.198 Other 
commentators also criticized The Megan Meier Act as too harsh.199 
Berin Szoka and Adam Theirer asserted that criminal records, 
particularly felony records, should not be doled out for peer-to-peer 
harassment.200 Such a result would stigmatize offenders for life 
because of their childhood blunders.201 
In expanding existing criminal law to include more instances of 
bullying behavior, lawmakers must also be mindful of the First 
Amendment. Off-campus Internet speech should be entitled to First 
Amendment protection, whether the speech is produced by a student 
or an adult.202 As the Supreme Court observed in Texas v. Johnson,203 
“[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it 
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”204 Hence, lawmakers must be careful to differentiate 
between criminally sanctionable conduct and constitutionally 
protected speech.205 
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B. The Civil Justice System 
In addition to criminal liability, cyberbullies may also be subject to 
civil liability. Defamation is one possible civil cause of action.206 
Cyberbullying is defamatory because it “tends so to harm the 
reputation of [the victim] as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter [others] from associating or dealing with 
him.”207 As compared to spoken words, written words are more 
permanent, capable of wider circulation, and show greater 
deliberation and intention on the part of the speaker.208 Because 
written words are particularly destructive, they more frequently lead 
to defamation actions.209 Hence, anyone who posts something that 
injures the reputation of another could face a defamation lawsuit.  
However, in a defamation action the victim must also prove that 
the damaging statements were false.210 Thus, while a defamation 
action may ensnare false rumors, it does nothing to curtail harmful 
statements that are truthful. For instance, a student who was 
relentlessly bullied because of his sexual orientation would be unable 
to sue his attacker for defamation. 
Invasion of privacy is an alternative option that may be employed 
where the elements of defamation are not met. The Second 
Restatement of Torts provides that:  
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private 
life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion 
of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that . . . 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and . . . is 
not of legitimate concern to the public.211  
Although the Supreme Court has held that there can be no liability 
for publicizing information that is a matter of public record,212 the 
posts and text messages written by bullies more often involve matters 
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of private concern. Thus, a bullying victim may bring an invasion of 
privacy action against a bully who publicizes private information 
about him. 
The victim might also sue his bully for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. “[The individual] who by extreme and outrageous 
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to 
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress . . . .”213 This 
cause of action is limited, however, in that it does not extend to mere 
insults, humiliations, or threats.214 
Despite numerous causes of action available to victims, the civil 
justice system fails as a practical solution to cyberbullying for several 
reasons. First, victims often hide their victimization from their parents 
for fear that they will be bullied even more.215 Parents cannot initiate 
a civil suit if they are unaware that their child is being bullied. Even if 
the parents were aware of the situation, a lawsuit further publicizes 
the potentially embarrassing facts giving rise to the bullying. Second, 
because a bully can hide behind screen names and e-mails, it may be 
difficult to ascertain his identity.216 Therefore, while the civil justice 
system is always an option, cyberbullying presents unique issues that 
the current system is unable to address. More is needed to adequately 
address the problem.217 
C. An Education-Based Approach 
Many teens are immature and cannot comprehend the 
consequences of their actions.218 Through an education-based 
approach, bullies may be better able to understand the impact of their 
behavior on others.219  
Several organizations have already launched online campaigns to 
educate Americans of all ages. In the early 1990’s, a short film called 
Trevor told the story of a gay thirteen-year-old boy who attempted 
suicide after his peers rejected him.220 Trevor inspired the 
establishment of the Trevor Project to focus on crisis and suicide 
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prevention among lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) 
teens.221 Following the rash of teen suicides in the fall of 2010, the 
Trevor Project launched the “It Gets Better” campaign, which 
involved celebrities such as Ellen DeGeneres and Tim Gunn, filming 
testimonial videos of support.222 The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services recently organized an anti-bullying campaign aimed 
at five- to eight-year-old children. Students can access the “Stop 
Bullying Now” campaign online for educational information, games, 
and videos.223 The site also has a section where parents can learn 
about bullying awareness, prevention, and intervention.224 MTV’s “A 
Thin Line” campaign aims to help teens “identify, respond to, and 
stop the spread of digital abuse,”225 providing information concerning 
textual harassment and cyberbullying in a teen-friendly format.226 
These messages offer a unique approach in that they tend to focus 
on bullying itself, rather than the means by which it is communicated. 
They do not differentiate between the traditional and cyber forms of 
bullying. While the consequences of cyberbullying are more 
severe,227 preventive measures aimed at all forms of bullying may be 
more effective than those aimed at a particular mode.228 
A solution to the bullying epidemic also requires educators, 
parents, and the community to take a stand. By our inaction, we are 
all part of the problem.229 Teachers and school officials at South 
Hadley High School have been subject to harsh criticism for failing to 
take any action to protect Phoebe Prince. School officials never 
contacted her parents to discuss the problem.230 One report indicated 
that a staff member idly looked on as Phoebe suffered verbal attacks 
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in the library, just hours before she hanged herself.231 Although the 
school’s inaction was not criminal, the District Attorney called it 
“troublesome.”232 Some believe that a better-informed school 
community could have saved Phoebe; Phoebe’s aunt explained that 
“[t]he signs were there [but] there was no support.”233  
One reason why teachers and school administrators have failed in 
protecting bullied students is that they may not understand the 
injurious effects of bullying. It is crucial that the school community 
receive training to detect, respond to, and prevent such behavior. The 
Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, which seeks to prevent and 
reduce bullying in schools, has served as a model for communities all 
around the country.234 The program encourages schools, among other 
things, to establish antibullying committees and hold staff 
discussions.235  
Schools can also create forums where students, teachers, and 
parents can collectively discuss bullying issues and solutions, such as 
the anti-bullying task force that South Hadley High School 
implemented after Phoebe Prince’s suicide.236 One parent, 
commenting on the task force’s efforts, stated that “[t]eachers are 
more receptive to our complaints.”237 
It is equally important that schools “establish and maintain a 
school climate of respect and integrity” and punish students for on-
campus violations.238 Schools play a very important, albeit secondary, 
role in socializing children.239 They must teach students that bullying 
behavior will not be tolerated at school.240 The Olweus Bullying 
Prevention Program asks school administrators to “ensure that all 
staff intervene on the spot when bullying occurs.”241  
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To reinforce the antibullying message, schools can implement 
creative disciplinary measures aimed at education. For instance, a 
bully might be required to create an informational poster for public 
display.242 Such a punishment would educate not only the bully, but 
also those students who view the poster. Schools could also request 
that students sign an antibullying pledge.243 One reason students bully 
is that they witness similar behavior from others.244 Perhaps seeing 
their classmates promise to respect others will encourage would-be 
bullies to do the same. 
Children may be more likely to hear and appreciate the message if 
it comes from both their school and their parents. Schools should 
invite parents to join their antibullying committees and discussions.245 
Parents could then reinforce at home what their children are learning 
about bullying in school. They may explain the reasons that people 
bully, that bullying is harmful and has injurious consequences, and 
that students face punishment for engaging in such behavior.246 
Parents should also teach their children about responsible Internet 
use, clearly communicating and consistently enforcing Internet 
rules.247 Parents can easily monitor that these rules are complied with 
by keeping computers in a highly trafficked room.248 
Community commitment also plays an important role in 
remedying the bullying problem. Community leaders can raise 
awareness about the issue, and spread antibullying messages 
throughout the community.249 For instance, they could sponsor a 
bullying awareness day for students to learn about the problem in a 
fun, yet educational environment. They could also invite students, 
parents, and educators to attend community discussions.250  
Even bystanders may take action. “[B]y doing nothing, 
[bystanders] are doing something.”251 By allowing bullying to 
continue in our presence, we may inadvertently condone the behavior. 
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Bystanders “can make a huge difference” by standing up for a 
victim.252 
The Adolescent Web Awareness Requires Education (AWARE) 
Act incorporates this sort of educational approach.253 The AWARE 
Act authorizes $125 million in grants to establish Internet crime 
awareness and prevention programs.254 Educational organizations, 
nonprofit organizations, and schools may use the grants to develop 
professional training programs for teachers and administrators and 
educational campaigns for parents about teaching children how to 
protect themselves from cybercrimes.255 The AWARE Act aims to 
inspire nonprofit Internet-safety organizations, schools, and 
communities to join forces to educate students, teachers, and parents 
about these risks.256  
Experts have commended the scope and purpose of the AWARE 
Act. Michael W. MacLeod-Ball of the American Civil Liberties 
Union described the bill as “a better step forward than an overbroad 
attempt to criminalize certain kinds of online speech.”257 John 
Palfrey, a Harvard Law School professor, said “the education support 
described in the ‘AWARE Act’ is precisely the right place to start 
from here.”258  
However, some commentators have criticized the AWARE Act. 
While the education-based approach requires substantial funding, 
some commentators would rather see federal funds employed 
differently.259 House subcommittee member Representative Louie 
Gohmert questioned whether the government should “spend another 
$125 million of Chinese money that we will have to borrow in order 
to insert the Federal bureaucracy into a problem whose true resolution 
begins at home.”260 
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Despite its limitations, an education-based approach can create 
room to prevent cyberbullying where the Constitution leaves none. 
Given the troublesome situation many teens face today, educators 
have a moral duty to incorporate bullying awareness into their 
curriculum. Parents and community members have a similar 
obligation. The bullying epidemic will undoubtedly continue in the 
absence of collaboration from everyone to reverse its trend.261 It is 
true, however, that these ideas cannot be realized without proper 
funding. 
D. A Legislative Proposal 
Education is primarily a state and local responsibility and, 
consequently, the federal role in education is limited.262 Schools and 
local municipalities are in the best position to determine the conduct 
that they should prohibit. In his concurring opinion in Morse, Justice 
Breyer noted that, because “[s]tudents will test the limits of 
acceptable behavior in myriad ways better known to schoolteachers 
than to judges[,] school officials need a degree of flexible authority to 
respond to disciplinary challenges.”263 Accordingly, states are entitled 
to enact their own laws aimed at bullying awareness and prevention. 
Laws in nearly every state address bullying or harassment in 
schools.264 In recent years, legislators have amended many of them to 
reach electronic communications.265 Section Five of the Illinois 
School Code now provides that: 
No student shall be subjected to bullying . . . during any 
school sponsored education program or activity; . . . while in 
school, on school property, on school buses or other school 
vehicles, at designated school bus stops waiting for the school 
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bus, or at school-sponsored or school-sanctioned events or 
activities; or . . . through the transmission of information from 
a school computer, a school computer network, or other 
similar electronic school equipment.266 
Unfortunately, the widespread misuse of Tinker has led some 
states to go too far in extending the definition of electronic 
communications in their anti-bullying statutes. For example, under an 
Oklahoma statute the electronic communication need not originate at 
school or with school equipment, but is included under the policy if it 
is “specifically directed at students or school personnel.”267 This 
impermissibly includes student expression that occurs entirely off-
campus. Moreover, to date, many states have not embraced the 
education-based approach of the AWARE Act and the Olweus 
Bullying Prevention Program. 
Because education itself cannot eradicate bullying, it is equally 
important that the law include remedial measures.268 Teachers should 
be required to report bullying behavior to a designated authority 
within the school, and school officials should have a legal duty to 
investigate all reported incidents. Moreover, schools should have to 
notify parents whenever their student is involved in a bullying 
incident, whether the child was the bully or the victim. 
If state legislatures fail to adopt cyberbullying laws or, as the 
Oklahoma legislature has done, adopt overly broad laws in 
contravention of the First Amendment, Congress may consider 
enacting laws of its own. Federal legislation would provide Congress 
the opportunity to differentiate speech that is constitutionally 
protected from that which is subject to school discipline. Congress 
could adopt the language of the Illinois School Code269 and explicitly 
define the school environment. In consideration of modern 
technology, the definition should provide that speech communicated 
at school via phone, school computer, or any other digital technology 
is considered on-campus speech and regulated where it causes a 
substantial disruption. This will clarify a point that has been 
complicated by inconsistent judicial rulings. In addition, States that 
allow for punishment of student speech outside that environment 
could risk losing their funding. 
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Federal legislation could also provide a remedy for the states’ 
failure to adopt an education-based approach, conditioning the receipt 
of funds on the development of awareness and prevention campaigns 
for students, professional training programs for teachers, or 
educational campaigns for parents. That the federal government 
normally plays a limited role in education does not prevent it from 
fixing the terms upon which education funding shall be disbursed. In 
South Dakota v. Dole,270 the Supreme Court held that Congress may, 
under its spending power, attach conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds, provided that such conditions meet certain requirements. First, 
the exercise of the spending power “must be in pursuit of the general 
welfare.”271 Congress must also state any condition of funding 
unambiguously, thereby “enabling the States to exercise their choice 
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”272 
Moreover, conditions on federal grants may be illegitimate if they are 
unrelated “to the federal interest in particular national projects or 
programs” or there is an independent constitutional bar to the 
funding.273 Finally, Congress must ensure that its financial 
inducement does not rise to the level of unconstitutional coercion or 
compulsion.274 
Congress could easily adopt antibullying legislation that meets the 
requirements set forth in Dole. First, laws that address bullying serve 
an undeniably public purpose, which is of chief concern to the 
Department of Education, of ensuring a safe and disciplined school 
climate.275 Moreover, this legislation would not induce the states to 
act in an unlawful manner,276 there is no independent constitutional 
bar to the funding. Schools receive only ten percent of their funds 
from the federal government and this conditional grant would involve 
only a small fraction of that funding. This can hardly be considered 
coercive. Therefore, provided that all conditions are unambiguously 
stated, Congress may enact a law that conditions the receipt of federal 
education funding on compliance with its anti-bullying legislation. 
                                                                                                                 
270 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
271 Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
272 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
273 Id. at 207–08 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
274 Id. at 211. 
275 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2007—12 12 (2007), 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/strat/plan2007-12/2007-plan.pdf (identifying the 
promotion of a safe and disciplined learning environment as one of the Department of 
Education’s objectives in improving student achievement). 
276 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (holding that Congress may not use its spending power to 
induce state action that would itself be unconstitutional). 
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CONCLUSION 
Cyberbullying is a rising concern that our nation is obligated to 
address. The line between on- and off-campus speech has become so 
blurred, and caused so much confusion, that clear boundaries must be 
drawn. The answer, however, does not lie in stripping students of 
their First Amendment rights. A student who speaks outside the 
“schoolhouse gate” is no longer a student and, therefore, Tinker does 
not apply. He or she is instead a “person,” and should be afforded the 
full protection of the First Amendment. The criminal and civil justice 
systems might allow victims, parents, and communities to punish 
bullies that go too far, but it is clear that significant inadequacies exist 
in both regimes. Neither criminal or civil penalties would sufficiently 
curtail cyberbullying and its effects. An education-based approach 
can fill the voids left by these systems of justice. Either the state or 
federal government should enact laws aimed at bullying awareness 
and prevention. Such laws will enable schools, parents, and 
community members to better explain the consequences of bullying, 
and the heightened abuse of cyberbullying, behavior to teens. It is 
only through a communal collaboration that the bullying epidemic 
can be appropriately addressed. 
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